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AUTOMOBILE SAFETY: A DIAGNOSIS OF AN -EPIDEMIC
Our country is currently faced with a major epidemic on'its high-
ways. The severity and magnitude of this problem are such that it
demands intensive and immediate action, yet our current efforts in
curtailing the number of deaths and injuries caused by automobiles
have been ineffective and misdirected. The problem has reached such
grave proportions and poses such a serious threat to the safety of
every individual in our society that there is an immediate need for
the formulation of a national policy on automobile safety.' From
1900 through 1964 motor vehicles have accounted for 1,510,000 deaths
in the United States, while war deaths from 1775 through 1964 to-
taled only 605,000.2 We have well-established military and foreign
policies, yet there has been no manifestation of a national policy on
automobile safety. We must act now to launch an effective attack
against this carnage on our highways. This action should be directed
primarily toward producing safer automobiles, for it is the vehicle not
the driver that is the major factor in producing injury and death in
automobile accidents.3
To realize the danger and magnitude of this threat to our national
safety, it is perhaps best to examine some statistics concerning, auto-
mobile accidents. In'1965 49,000 Americans died in autmobile acci-
dents.4 The annual death toll remained at about 37,506 for over a
generation until 1962 when deaths from automobile accidents ex-
ceeded 40,000 for the first time." Despite the increase in fatalities
caused by automobile accidents, the number of deaths per miles of
travel had been constantly decreasing 7 until 1962 when that figure
lIn a recent message to a meeting of the American Trial Lawyers Association,
President Johnson said, "'You and I know ... that the gravest problem before
this nation-next to the war in Vietnam-is the death and destruction, the
shocking and senseless carnage, that strikes daily on our highways and that takes
a higher and more terrible toll each year.'" The National Observer, Feb. 7, 1966,
p. 15, col. 1.
2112 Cong. Rec. 1841 (daily ed. Feb. 2,1966).
31fra note 39.
4The National Observer, Feb. 7, 1966, p. 1, col.
GMoynihan, Public Health and Traffic Safety, 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 93
(1960).
CO'Connell, Taming the Automnobile, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 299 -(1963).
7Moynihan, supra note 5.
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also started to rise." As grim as these figures may be, they do not tell
the entire story. They are somewhat misleading because the majority
of accidents result in injuries rather than death. "For every fatal
injury there are upwards of 125 non-fatal injuries." 9 Thus a better
measure of the magnitude of the problem is the number of non-fatal
injuries, yet these statistics are much harder to ascertain and are much
less reliable than the death figures. 10 According to the National Health
Survey, there are about 4,500,000 people injured in vehicular accidents
annually, and of these, approximately 200,000 suffer some permanent
disability." In addition to the tremendous loss of health and life,
traffic accidents result in great economic loss. They result in "wage
losses of $1,550,000,000, property damage of $1,850,000,000, medical
expenses of $150,000,000, and overhead insurance costs of $1,750,000,-
000,", 12 a total of $5.3 billion.
These figures indicate the enormity of the problem and the threat
it poses to our health and economy; yet the problem continues to
grow, and there has been little effective effort directed at its correc-
tion. When we consider how long the problem has existed and con-
trast it with the progress made in other fields of public health,' 3 "it
has become something of a national scandal, one of the series of prob-
lems that seem to defy solution by a democratic free-enterprise
society." 14
There are several reasons why the problem continues to grow. The
indifference of the automobile manufacturers to the problem and their
refusal to initiate effective voluntary improvements is certainly one
of the reasons.
Automobile manufacturers utilize their tremendous resources and
their brilliant array of engineering talent to enhance the appear-





Kennedy, "Why Can't We Make Cars Safer?," Popular Science, Nov. 1965,
pp. 63, 64.
SMoynihan, supra note 5, at 94.
'OHearings on S. Res. 56 Before the Subco7mnittee on Executive Reorganiza-
tion of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 260-61 (1965) [hereafter cited as 1965 Hearings pt. 1].
:"O'Connell, supra note 6, at 302.
121d. at 303.
1SMoynihan, supra note 5, at 93.
14 Moynihan, The Legal Regulation of Automobile Design, Passenger Car De-
sign and Highway Safety, 265, 276 (1961).
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ance of their product, to boost the horsepower and improve the
compression ratio of the engines, and to make driving effortless by
power equipment. They do everything except apply the intelli-
gence of the average school boy to protecting the lives of the
peoples who ride in their automobiles.15
Another major factor in the continuing epidemic is the futility of the
present approaches to traffic safety. 16
The present approaches to correcting the automobile safety prob-
lem are constantly directed toward the human element-the driver.
This is due primarily to the fact that the overwhelming number of
automobile accidents are the result of human error.' 7 Thus the ten-
dency has been to direct all efforts at reducing death and injury toward
the cause of the accident rather than toward the design of the vehicle
which is the main factor in causing injury.' Drivers have generally
been regarded as law observers who follow legal regulations regardless
of any tendency that might arise from the design of their vehicles.' 9
The current approaches to the problem are directed toward accident
prevention and can be divided into 3 main groups: (1) exhorta-
tion, (2) civil liability, and (3) criminal punishment.
20
(1) The most striking example of exhortation directed toward the
driver is the ever-present highway sign proclaiming "speed kills" and
warning "slow down and live." These signs are designed to frighten
the motorist into safe driving, but probably they are completely dis-
regarded. The average American motorist considers himself a superior
driver, and refuses to associate himself with the death and destruction
portrayed in such grizzly advertising. His basic optimism makes him
unable to comprehend that such terrible things will happen to him.2'
' 5 Katz, The Liability in Tort or Warranty of Automobile Manufacturers for
the Inherently Dangerous Design of Passenger Automobiles, 37 Chi. B. Record
363, 364 (1955).
'0A general lack of knowledge in the field has also been an important factor
in our lack of success with the problem. 1965 Hearings pt. 1, at 282.
170'Connell, supra note 6, at 318.
'81d. at 334.
'OMoynihan, supra note 14, at 273.
200'Connell, supra note 6, at 306.
2t The National Safety Council's much-publicized predictions of holiday death
tolls reflect the unreal aspect of such campaigns. "Over the years these pre-
holiday pronouncements have lost their necromantic quality and become rather
like the posting of odds before a big race: a sure sign that exciting moments
and good times are on the way. The deaths, when they come, seem no more
real than the weekly television toll of the hired guns." Moynihan, "Epidemic on
the Highways," The Reporter, Apr. 30, 1959, p. 16.
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In fact, the odds that he will escape death are in his favor: there are
only 5.7 fatalities for every 100,000,000 miles traveled.
22
In addition to providing no specific advice except "slow down" and
"speed kills," the signs-advocating a lesser rate of speed-even if they
are heeded-are of no practical value in reducing the number of acci-
dents, for speed is not a major factor in causing accidents. 23 A survey
conducted by the Bureau of Public Roads revealed "that for speeds
from 35 mph to 65 mph the faster you drive, the fewer accidents
you have." 24 Although higher speed is not a factor in causing acci-
dents, it would seem that higher speeds should increase the risk of
injury to the driver, but it appears that greater speed does not corre-
late with more serious injury or death.25 These risks are influenced
more by the design of the vehicle than by raw speed.
26
(2) 'Imposing civil liability on the errant driver is no more effective
in improving the traffic safety problem than exhortation. It is gen-
erally agreed that the 3 basic purposes of tort law are compensa-
tion, pro~hylaxis, and punishment for fault. How effective are these
principles in improving automobile safety? In the first place, the com-
pensatory purpose of tort law is directed toward repaying the loss
after the harm has resulted and is of no value in preventing the acci-
dent from occurring. The second purpose, prophylaxis, seldom enters
into the problem because few accidents are intentional, and most occur
without forethought of any legal consequences.27 Certainly, since the
development time of the average accident is less than 10 seconds, the
average driver is probably not thinking of his insurance coverage
during that period. It is also true that those at fault in automobile
accidents seldom pay, because of the availability, and in some juris-
dictions the mandatory nature, of at least marginally adequate insur-
ance coverage.
28
22Kennedy, supra note 8.
23An attempt to solve the problem by cracking down on speeders was under-
taken by Senator Abraham Ribicoff when he was governor of Connecticut. The
result was that the number of deaths decreased slightly but the rate of accidents
and injuries increased. After 4 years of intensive enforcement of speeding
laws and suspension of licenses the chance of injury increased 8% for every
mile traveled. Moynihan, supra note 5, at 94.
24Moynihan, supra note 5, at 94.
25The increase in fatal injuries is relatively small in the range from 0-60 mph,
but in speeds over 60 the danger of serious or fatal injuries increases 3
times. O'Connell, supra note 6, at 309.
261d. at 309.
27t ee Conrad, Automobile Accident Costs and Payments, 88-90 (Mich. Legal
Studies).
2 8Only New York, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have compulsory
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(3) In addition to involvement with civil law, the automobile safety
problem is necessarily related to criminal law. In fact, the American
people probably have more contact with their government through
the legal regulation of their automobiles than through any other
source.2 9 Naturally, the application of criminal law to automobile
accidents involves no element of compensation for its primary purpose
is the deterrence of offenses.
The threat of fines and loss of licenses may act as a more effective
deterrent to the average motorist than the threat of death or injury,
primarily because the threat of criminal punishment is not so remote
as the threat of death. However, here again too much emphasis is
placed on the driver's ability to prevent accidents rather than on the
inherent shortcomings of the vehicle.30 The result of the criminal law
regulation of traffic has been to make us a nation of law violators,
31
and there is not much evidence indicating that such regulation has
been effective in reducing accidents. Even more important is the effect
criminal regulation has had on the individual's regard for the law and
the legal process. The criminal law should have the support of society
and should be premised upon having a reasonable opportunity to
conform one's conduct to the standard required by the law. "Mani-
festly, a good criminal law should be clear and comprehensible; else
how is the citizen to conform and thereby be deterred?" 32 Most traf-
fic laws are in direct conflict with this basic principle of criminal law
because they are essentially vague and uncertain.
33
Another obvious fault with the criminal law regulating traffic viola-
tions is that sanctions are imposed without regard to whether the
driver's conduct was conscious or unconscious, voluntary or involun-
automobile liability insurance. Statement by State Senator Simon J. Liebowitz
(N.Y)., Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicles, Traffic
and Highway Safety, before the Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganiza-
tion, Feb. 3, 1966, p. 4. It has been estimated that 85% of automobile drivers
have liability insurance. Supra note 27, &t 90.
29Moynihan, supra note 14, at 271.3OThis is not to suggest that driver error is not an important factor in
traffic accidents for it is a significant factor in causing accidents. O'Connell,
supra note 6, at 322-31. It is suggested, however, that this overemphasis on
driver responsibility has thus far done little to reduce effectively the great
number of automobile accidents.
3lMoynihan, supra note 14, at 272.320'Connell, supra note 6, at 314.
331d. at 315. A recent study by the American Trial Lawyers Association,
Stop Murder by Motor, indicates that even when the law is a clear one, such
as a speed-limit law, the "driver puts too much faith in the protective power
of traffic regulations. He feels that if he obeys the traffic regulations he is
safe." 112 Cong. Rec. 1841 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1966).
1966]
332 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIII
tary.34 Motor vehicle laws are governed by the principle of malum
prohibitum, which may mean that the defendant is convicted regard-
less of any knowledge that his act was wrongful.3 5 Thus a driver who
checks his tail lights before leaving home and finds them to be func-
tioning properly is guilty of a violation if they later go out through
no fault of his own. His guilt thus depends upon chance and not
upon his own carelessness. How effective are such laws in promoting
safety' if the driver is found guilty regardless of the fact that he has
made every effort to comply with such laws?
The punishments established for traffic violations are seldom arrived
at rationally or scientifically, and if the sanctions are designed to serve
a specific purpose, it is usually to provide revenue rather than to deter
improper driving and accidents.36 The average citizen knows this and
it is certainly not conducive to respect for the law; in fact, this ar-
bitrary application of law may encourage drivers to do all they can
to escape punishment rather than convincing them to observe traffic
laws.
No doubt there are valid arguments for the present approaches to
the automobile accident problem, but the fact remains that "the
number of violations and accidents continue to rise." 37
Rather than allowing the increasing number of deaths and injuries
on our highways to continue to mock our futile approaches to the cur-
tailment of traffic accidents, should we not seek some new approach to
the problem? The logical answer would appear to be to approach
the problem at its crux, the vehicle itself. Rather than continuing to
direct our effort toward the driver and the multitude of human fac-
tors involved, it seems more probable that the real progress will be
made by improving the crash-resistant features of the vehicle. 8 For
34Mueller, How To Increase Traffic Fatalities: A Useful Guide for Modern
Legislators and Traffic Courts, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 944, 957 (1960).
35Ibid.
36 0'Connell, supra note 6, at 316.
37Moynihan, supra note 14, at 272.
38Moynihan, "Epidemic on the Highways," The Reporter, Apr. 30, 1959, p. 16.
Moynihan has suggested that efforts directed toward emphasis on driver responsi-
bility are a "most serious disservice to traffic safety" and that it "seems a little
bit like trying to stop a typhoid epidemic by urging each family to boil its own
drinking water and not eat oysters.. . ." Id. at p. 17. Our attention should be
directed toward factors we can reasonably hope to control rather than "to
factors such as the temperament and behavior of 80 million drivers, which
are not susceptible to any form of consistent, over-all control. .. " Ibid.
"Individuals are not perfect, and individuals will make mistakes, and individuals
will drive carelessly. We should do everything we can to have good drivers and
good roads .... However, we must take into account that since millions of
people drive automobiles, and many of them are careless, at least the car they
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it is the vehicle-not the driver-that is the major factor in producing
injury and death.39 "[T] raffic accidents should come to be looked upon
as the inevitable result of putting the power of hundreds of herses
[sic] into frail human hands for use in a crowded and intractable
world of snow or darkness or glare." 40 By concentrating on the ve-
hicle one can ignore the enormous number of variables inevitable in
dealing with individual drivers. In addition, the improvements can
be effected by a handful of automobile manufacturers rather than by
the 110 million drivers expected by 1970.41
For the purpose of this discussion we will assume that there do
exist adequate changes that can be made in the vehicle which will
effectively reduce the deaths and injuries resulting from automobile
accidents.42 The General Services Administration, purchasing agent
for the federal government, regards the following design improve-
ments as important enough to require them on all 1967 automobiles
the Government will buy:
[P] added dash and vents, recessed instruments and controls on the
instrument panel, impact-absorbing steering wheel and steering
column, safety door latches and hinges, anchorage for seat belt
assemblies, anchorage of seats, dual-brake system, standard gear
quadrant (P-R-N-D-L), safety glass, glare reduction surfaces on
the instrument panel and windshield wipers, tires and safety rims,
exhaust emission control system to limit the amount of air-pol-
luting elements from the tailpipe, windshield wipers and washers,
standard bumper heights, four-way flasher that will flash all signal
drive should give them as much protection as they [sic) possibly can, not only
the careless driver but the innocent victim of a careless driver." Hearings on
S. Res. 56 Before the Subcomnittee on Executive Reorganization of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 849 (1965)
[hereafter cited as 1965 Hearings pt. 2].
90'Connell, supra note 6, at 334. Moynihan quotes Dr. C. Hunter Shelden
writing in 159 A.M.A.J. 981 (1955): "'The accidents may occur as the result of
speed, inadequate highways, poor judgment, or mechanical failure, but none of
these actually causes the passenger injury. The injury occurs primarily as a
result of faulty interior design of the automobile:" Moynihan, supra note 38, at
20.
400'Connell, supra note 6, at 323.
411965 Hearings pt. 1, at 434.
42EImer Paul of the United States Public Health Service Accident Prevention
Bureau estimates that if our cars were built differently and certain safety
devices were used, 43% of those killed in autos might be alive today:' Kennedy,
supra note 8. Ralph Nader in his book, Unsafe at Any Speed, has said that 42%
of those killed in automobile accidents have died under survivable conditions.
112 Cong. Rec. 1986 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1966)..
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lights together to warn of hazard, backup lights, outside rear-
view mirror.48
An example of the value of incorporating new safety devices in au-
tomobiles and of what can be done to improve the safety of the ve-
hicle is a feasibility study prepared by Republic Aviation Division of
Fairchild-Hiller Corporation under the auspices of the New York State
Motor Vehicle Department. This study shows that it is feasible to
build a prototype safety car that will result in the virtual elimination
of injuries and deaths up to impact speeds of 50 mph even in head-on
collisions with another vehicle traveling at the same speed.4" Assuming
that automobiles can be made safer, how should these changes be
made? There seem to be 2 ways to achieve the desired result: volun-
tary reform by the manufacturers or mandatory reform through
government regulation.
In the past, it has been the general opinion of the American people
that the automobile manufacturers are responsible firms which are
producing the safest product possible.45 However, in the light of
recent publicity and the moderate concern over traffic safety, it ap-
pears that the manufacturers are not using their resources to improve
effectively the safety of their product, and that a safer vehicle can
be manufactured.46 Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff has said, "I think
431965 Hearings pt. 1, at 242. The General Services Administration has just re-
cently added 9 new safety devices to this list and will require them on all 1968
models purchased: window and door controls placed either in out-of-the-way
locations or of types that would break away upon impact, recessed or break
away ashtrays, arm rests without sharp corners, padding on backs of the front
seats, electric or reflective side markers that show the outline of stopped cars
at night, rear window defrosters, roll bars for soft-top vehicles, and fuel
tanks and lines that will not burst upon impact. Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Feb. 17, 1966, p. 22.
44Statement of State Senator Edward J. Speno (N.Y.) before Senate Sub-
Committee on Executive Reorganization, Feb. 3, 1966, p. 4.
45Moynihan, supra note 14, at 273.
46This view has been expounded by Ralph Nader in Unsafe at Any Speed, a
book that has been described as "likely to be the Silent Spring of traffic safety."
150 Science 1136 (1965). Mr. Nader sums up the attitude of the automobile
industry towards the proposition that their cars could be made safer with this
quotation from a 1961 statement of General Motors President John F. Gordon:
"'The traffic safety field ... has in recent years been particularly beset by
self-styled experts with radical and ill-conceived proposals.... The general
thesis of these amateur engineers is that cars could be made virtually foolproof
and crashproof, that this is the only practical route to greater safety and that
federal regulation of vehicle design is needed. This thesis is, of course, wholly
unrealistic.... The suggestion that we abandon hope of teaching drivers to
avoid traffic accidents and concentrate on designing cars that will make col-
19661 NOT
the automobile industry is dragging its feet. I think the automobile
industry has a big responsibility to the American people that they
are not fulfilling." 4 Why the relative indifference of the autmobile
manufacturers?
The highly competitive nature of the automobile industry is per-
haps the largest single factor in the reluctance of the manufacturers
to emphasize safety in their product. "No feature of our economy,
other than defense, so dominates the national economy." 48 These
safety innovations would necessarily increase production costs because
they would necessitate rechanneling of resources into extensive re-
search programs, but a company like General Motors which had a
profit of $1.7 billion last year49 could certainly absorb the initial
rechanneling cost. The production cost would then decrease as fea-
tures were engineered into the vehicle.
Because of the tremendous race for sale, consumer demand is all-
important to the manufacturers; and to the consumer, styling and
appearance, not safety, are the most important factors in the choice
of a new car.r° The automobile industry spends millions of dollars
every year in advertising its product. If this advertising is a valid
projection of consumer demand, a random sampling of the medium
shows that the consumer is not interested in safety:
A howitzer with windshield wipers. The new Buick Skylark Gran
Sport . . . is almost like having your own, personal-type nuclear
deterrent.5 '
New package of instant action: Olds 442 . . . the sweetest piece
of live action on wheels!
52
The Riviera with muscles on its muscles. New Riviera Gran
Sport. We have discovered... a cluster of hotbloods ... yearn-
ing for a little more heat.58
What sets Pontiac apart? . . . a tigerish 389-cubic inch V-8 en-
gine ... and a look that others can't seem to capture 
. . .54
lisions harmless is a perplexing combination of defeatism and wishful thinking."'
Id. at 1136-37. See book review of Unsafe at Any Speed, this issue Wash. and
Lee L. Rev. at 445.
471965 Hearings pt. 1, at 242.
480'Connell, supra note 6, at 357.
491965 Hearings pt. 2, at 780.
500'Connell, supra note 6, at 357.
8 1Time, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 56.52Thne, Jan. 5, 1965, p. 1.53Time, Apr. 23, 1965, p. 5.
54Esquire, Apr. 1965, p. 41.
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If you're in'search of... size and luxury in your next car,' you
should drive a 1965 Cadillac soon.55
Buick Electra 225: . . .eloquent, long, graceful, infinitely luxu-
rious. Make the merest turn... like a cruise to Nassau.56
But there is no doubt that in addition to measuring public tastes, ad-
vertising is also instrumental in creating them.57 Speed, styling, and
luxury are preeminent in the public mind. As a result the industry,
forever fearful of its future prosperity, continues to meet the buying
public's demands which the industry itself has probably created.
There are instances which illustrate the manufacturer's willingness
to undertake safety innovations voluntarily, but the ineffectiveness of
such isolated instances is further evidence of the public's lack of con-
cern over safety and the industry's desire to preserve its solvency.
In 1956 Ford introduced various safety devices (padded dash, "deep
dished" steering wheel, safety door latches, and seat belts) and stressed
them in its advertising, while other manufacturers continued their
frenzied preoccupation with speed and power.5 8 The result of such
advertising and features was that Ford's sales dropped sharply and
that by August no further mention of the newly introduced safety
features was to be found in its advertising. Sales increased almost
immediately, but nevertheless 1956 was a poor year for Ford, and
the safety advertising was blamed.59 Ford had learned its lesson-the
public was not interested in safety.
Since the Ford fiasco of 1956, the industry has remained firm in its
stand against safety.60 It was not until the New York legislature
threatened compulsory installation that the manufacturers voluntarily
installed seat belts in their automobiles.61 Congress, in spite of quiet
55Time, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 33.
56Esquire, Apr. 1965, p. 57.
-5O'Connell, supra note 6, at 358. Mr. Roy Abernathy, President of American
Motors recognizes the effect of advertising on buyers: "I think there may be
some indication, Senator, that there are some people, particularly young people,
who are romanced by it [emphasis on speed and power] and might purchase
cars on that account. We are not against horsepower. We are against the
glamorizing of it." 1965 Hearings pt. 2, at 874.
5SMoynihan, supra note 38, p. 20.
Ibid.
60"We have found that obsolete concepts of salability based on styling still
reign in Detroit, despite recent assurances to the contrary. As an indication,
there is no one in the automobile industry in charge of safety design who has
vice-presidential status, but each of the Big Three has a vice-president for
styling." Statement of Assemblyman Alexander Chanavau (N.Y.) before the
Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, Feb. 3, 1966.
810'Connell, supra note 6, at 365.
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lobbying by the automobile manufacturers, recently passed a bill re-
quiring 17 additional safety devices in the automobiles purchased by
the General Services Administration for federal use. 2 The federal
government purchases 10,000 cars a year, and the manufacturers have
recently announced that they are voluntarily including these devices
(for example, safety door latches, anchorage of seats, dual brake
system, impact absorbing steering wheel and column) on all 1967
models produced. 63 Thus it appears that manufacturers have been
less than anxious to place the much-needed safety devices on their
automobiles; when they eventually do, it has been after considerable
pressure from the state and federal governments.
There are those who feel that the best method of encouraging the
manufacturers to undertake the task of reforming the design of their
vehicles voluntarily is fear of tort liability, 4 but the present applica-
tion of the law of products liability seems sadly unable to provide
the needed impetus. Prior obstacles to placing liability on manufac-
turers for harm caused by defective products, such as privity of con-
tract, have been steadily reduced in recent years,6 5 and the expansion
of the principles of products liability to include liability for negligent
design has provided a basis for imposing liability on automobile man-
ufacturers for the unsafe design of their vehicle." The Restatement
of Torts provides relatively adequate substantive law for holding a
manufacturer liable:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which
makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is
subject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the
chattle or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoptibn
of a safe plan or design.67
This enabling principle makes it clear that a manufacturer may be
held liable for unsafe design as well as for unsafe construction of a
vehicle, and 3 relatively recent cases have imposed liability for unsafe
62Washington Post, Apr. 1, 1965, § A, p. 39. See generally note 43 supra and
accompanying text.
OThe National Observer, Feb. 14, 1966, p. , col.
64Katz, supra note 15, at 366.
"1The landmark cases are MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916) (negligence); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (implied warranty); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962) (strict liability).
"8Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1956).
8IREsTATEmENr (Second), TORTS § 398, at 336 (1965).
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vehicle design. 8 However, while courts are willing to hold the manu-
facturer liable for injuries caused by various defects in construction, 69
they are usually reluctant to impose liability when the defect is one of
design. 70 As long as the vehicle is properly constructed and it or its com-
ponents function properly and do not break down due to some defect
in construction, there is generally no liability.71
An excellent example of the willingness of courts to impose liability
on manufacturers for defects in construction and their reluctance to
hold them liable for defects in design is Zahn v. Ford Motor Co.
72
There the passenger in the automobile was thrown against the dash-
board when the driver was forced to come to a sudden stop. His
head struck the jagged edge of a defectively made ashtray and his eye
was put out. He was allowed recovery from the manufacturer only
because of the defective construction of the ashtray, not because of
its negligent location or design. In so holding the court said: "If the
ashtray was properly prepared for anticipated use by owner or guest
there could be no liability on the part of Ford." 73
Thomas v. Jerominek74 is another example of the lengths to which
courts will go in refusing to impose liability for defective design. In
a suit for personal injuries the plaintiff alleged that her automobile
was constructed in an unsafe manner in that the door and window
knobs were indistinguishable. The court held that as a matter of law
the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because she complained "of nothing which relates to the
68Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954);
Hyatt v. Hyster Co., 106 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on stipulation of
the parties; 205 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1953); Clark v. Zuzich Truck Lines, 344
S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Kans. City Ct. App. 1961).
69See e.g., Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U. S. 921 (1953); Hupp Motor Car Corp. v. Wadsworth, 113 F.2d
827 (6th Cir. 1940); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930)
(tractor); Zahn v. Ford Motor Co, 164 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1958); Bird v.
Ford Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y. 1936).
70See e.g., Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1935); Ford
Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1929) (tractor); Davlin v. Henry
Ford & Son, Inc., 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927) (tractor); Thomas v. Jerominek,
8 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Reusch v. Ford Motor Co.,
196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938); Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341,
246 Pac. 945 (1926) (tractor).
71Zahn v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 65; Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., supra note
70. Contra Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., supra note 67; Hyatt v.
Hyster, supra note 67.
72164 F. Supp. 936 (D.Minn. 1958).
731d at 941.
748 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S. 2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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existence of a latent defect .... ,, 75 It would certainly seem that a
jury of reasonable men might have found that the manufacturer had
failed to "exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or
design," 71 but the court did not allow the case to progress beyond
the pleading stage.
77
Thus it is clear that the current attitude of the courts toward the
liability of automobile manufacturers for unsafe design of their prod-
uct is far from adequate. It has been suggested that
nothing in law or fact insulates the automobile manufacturer
from liability not only for defects in construction, which we have
long recognized, but . . . [also] for the creation of unnecessary
risk by the marketing of an automobile not reasonably designed
to protect the safety of its occupants.
78
The idea of imposing liability on a manufacturer for a negligently
designed vehicle is simply an application of the existing law of prod-
ucts liability to include, as it properly should, all aspects of the man-
ufacturing process from the drawing board through the actual con-
struction and sale of the vehicle or component part. A negligently
designed vehicle can create just as great a risk of harm as can one
which is negligently constructed. The test of liability should be not
only whether the manufacturer installed faulty door latches or ash-
trays, but also whether he has created an unreasonable risk to others
by placing a negligently designed vehicle on the market. The factors
which should determine the manufacturer's liability are those stated
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 79 by Judge Learned Hand: the
probability and magnitude of the risk weighed against the burden of
taking adequate precautions. Thus viewed it seems obvious that by
placing millions of automobiles on the road without using their tre-
mendous engineering potential to increase the safety of their prod-
ucts, the manufacturers have created perhaps the greatest risk and
have effected the most extensive neglect of duty in modem times.80
There is little doubt that the courts have failed to provide the nec-
essary incentive to force the manufacturers into voluntary reform of
751d. at 389-90.
76 RE rATEMENT (Second), TORTS § 398, at 336 (1965).
77Accord, Amason v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 70. This case also involved
a suit based upon defective design of rear-hinged doors. The court emphasized
that plaintiff had "not charged that any defective material was used in con-
structing the car or that any part of it broke." Id. at 266.
78Katz, supra note 15, at 365.
79159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
80Katz, supra note 15, at 365-66.
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their, vehicle designs. Even though the manufacturers could be held
liable under present concepts of products liability, the real question
is whether the courts are equipped to obtain the necessary expert
knowledge to be sufficiently familiar with what in fact constitutes a
dangerous design. They would necessarily rely more upon expert
testimony than independent research, but this may be inadequately
presented or misunderstood. Moreover the necessary reforms de-
pendent upon individual lawsuits could result in episodic reform.8'
One writer has suggested that the problem of the court's inadequate
research machinery and knowledge in the field of design has been
caused in part by trial attorneys who have failed to realize the role
played by the automobile in accidents and injuries.8 2  Attorneys
should direct their attention to vehicle design as a primary cause of
many of the injuries stemming from automobile accidents. It is fun-
damental to our adversary system that courts generally act only upon
issues, raised by the litigants through their attorneys, thus issues of
negligent design will not be considered unless the attorney takes this
initial step. By effective investigation at the site of the accident and
by making use of available external engineering information,83 attor-
neys will be able to impart to the court the necessary knowledge in
the field of automobile design. As more scientific knowledge of what
constitutes safe design becomes available and as the leading instrumen-
talities of injury in a vehicle are made known, the manufacturer's
liability for faulty design will develop with more precision;84 and as
courts develop a sense of confidence in their knowledge of the field
perhaps their reluctance to impose liability will gradually disappear.
This solution to the problem might be sound if the problem were
not one that demanded immediate action. The traffic safety problem
has reached such proportions that it is imperative that the fastest pos-
sible and most effective measures be instituted to bring about the
needed reforms. The solution can most probably "be achieved better
by a consistent application of regulatory standards drawn up by
experts and kept current by research, rather than by ad hoc decisions
of inexpert judges and juries." 85
It is apparent that the manufacturers have been reluctant to make
safer automobiles without some compulsion, and the courts have been
810'Connell, supra note 6, at 375.
82Nader, Automobile Design: Evidence Catching Up With the Law, 42 Den.
Law Cent. Jour. 32 (1965).
831d. at 33.
84Id. at 39.
850'Connell, supra note 6, at 375.
reluctant to compel design improvements by imposing liability for
unsafe design features. Even if the courts were to begin to impose
such liability on the manufacturers, this approach is not adequate to
achieve automotive safety in the near future or under a uniform plan.
Moreover, the law of products liability probably will refuse to
compel a manufacturer "to so design a product that it can be used
carelessly with impunity," 86 thus the aim of preventing deaths and
injuries which occur as a result of driver negligence and frailties
would not be achieved. In addition, the judicial process is necessarily
slow, and it would be some time before the results of liability for
negligent design would be manifested in the vehicle itself.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the only realistic
approach to the automobile safety problem is some sort of government
regulation of vehicle design. But should this regulation be on the state
or federal level?
The effectiveness of state regulation would be impeded by several
important factors. Any regulation would be far from uniform
8 7
unless the states enacted some type of uniform act, but such legisla-
tion is seldom accepted by every state, and if and when it is, it is
only after years of debate and trial and error.88 The lack of uni-
formity would hardly be advantageous to the manufacturer who could
conceivably be placed in a position of manufacturing over 50 dif-
ferent varieties of automobiles.89 Also, the effect such regulation might
have on interstate commerce is significant. A state would probably
be constitutionally unable to prohibit out-of-state vehicles which did
86Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YAI.- L.J. 816, 874 (1962).
87Moynihan, supra note 14, at 274.
88"[T]he passing of motor vehicle equipment safety laws by individual States
is the long way toward reaching our ultimate goal of safer automobiles ....
Motor vehicle equipment safety laws have become effective by the "trickle
down" method. After one State passes a law it is picked up by another and
another until finally the manufacturers capitulate . . ." Statement by State
Senator Simon J. Liebowitz (N.Y.), Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee
on Motor Vehicles, Traffic and Highway Safety before the Senate Subcommittee
on Executive Reorganization, Feb. 3, 1966, p. 1.
89An exchange between Senator Ribicoff and Frederick G. Donner, Chairman
of the Board of General Motors indicates the effect this would have on the
automobile industry:
"Senator Ribicoff. Well, can the automobile industry really produce on a
mass-production basis the manufacture and sale of automobiles if you have a
different standard in 50 different states?
Mr. Donner. No, we recognize that problem."
1965 Hearings pt. 2, at 792.
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not comply with its design standards from traveling on its highways.90
Thus the states would have to exclude such interstate vehicles from
its xegulations, and the regulations would become that much less ef-
fective in promoting safety on the highways. 91 Another obstacle
would be the cost of each state's establishing the various research
facilities needed to arrive at its own minimum standards. 92 Of course,
state cooperation in research could reduce this cost.
. Even if these obstacles could be overcome, the process of estab-
lishing effective state regulation of vehicle design would take con-
siderable time, and time is of the essence in solving a problem of this
magnitude.
Everything involved in the traffic safety problem seems to point
to the advisability of federal regulation. The problem is unquestion-
ably a national one and can best be handled by a central government
rather than by over fifty separate governments. 93 The automobile
industry is the only major element of our transportation system that
is not required to conform to federal safety standards,9 4 and the fact
that automobiles are necessarily involved in interstate commerce cer-
tainly permits active federal involvement.95
There is no question that the federal government is already involved
in the automobile safety problem;96 however, there is a question as to
the effectiveness of this involvement. Sixteen separate federal agen-
cies have some role in the federal automobile safety program.9 7 The
9OAny state regulation that prohibited the use of its highways to interstate
vehicles which did not comply with its design would probably be held unconsti-
tutional if it imposed a substantial burden on interstate commerce. Brenner,
Legal Requirements for the Equipment and Design of Private Motor Vehicles:
State Action and National Problems, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429, 448 (1955).
910'Connell, supra note 6, at 378.
921d. at 379.
93Brenner, supra note 90, at 448-49.
94Moynihan, supra note 14, at 276. "It should first be kept in mind that auto-
mobiles are but one of several common forms of transportation and that, al-
though design regulation is somewhat the exception with specific regard to
automobiles, it is the norm with regard to means of transportation in general.
Furthermore, the regulation of other means of transportation is, on the whole,
carried out at the federal level."Id. at 265.
951n 1915 the United States Supreme Court implied that federal control of
motor vehicles for safety purposes was proper and that the states were enabled
to exercise such authority only because of the absence of federal preemptive
legislation. Henrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). Safety regulations have
usually been looked upon with favor and "have but rarely raised either con-
stitutional or philosophical issues . . . ." Moynihan, supra note 14, at 265.
96The most recent Federal involvement in the automobile safety problem has
taken the form of the newly signed Federal Highway Safety Act which gives the
Secretary of Commerce certain regulatory powers.
971965 Hearings pt. 1, at 1.
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Division of Accident Prevention of the United States Public Health
Service, one of the agencies involved, administered a $2,700,000 study
into why accidents occur, but only $134,000 was spent for research
in vehicle safety design.98 The most curious of the government
programs is the President's Committee for Traffic Safety, which has
an annual budget of $200,000, of which $150,000 comes from federal
funds and $50,000 from insurance and automobile industry grants.99
Although this Committee enjoys the prestige of the President's name,
it seems to be controlled by an advisory council composed of rep-
resentatives of private organizations. 100 In fact, "the Committee is
Detroit's public relations annex at the White House." l There might
be some advantage to this diversity if the findings of the various
research programs could be coordinated and exchanged, but there is
no single agency that has the responsibility for coordinating the find-
ings of the various agencies or for prescribing policy. 12 Thus the
present federal involvement in traffic safety consists of 16 separate
agencies each working separately and lacking any single agency or
individual vested with the responsibility of coordinating all of the
efforts into a uniform system..
03
There have been several proposals for bringing about efficient fed-
eral involvement in the automobile safety problem. Perhaps the most
valid is the suggestion of former Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel
Moynihan that the proper means of formulating safety standards and
enforcing regulations would be to establish a Federal Automobile
Agency.'04 This agency would unite all intramural and extramural
research activities of the federal government in the field of highway
safety in one agency. Rather than concentrating only upon design
research, it should also have responsibility for research and devel-
opment of highway and driver safety programs. Such an agency
would provide a centralizing element for all the independent research
that is conducted by various organizations throughout the country
and could eliminate considerable duplication of effort.





1021965 Hearings, pt. 1, at 209, 233, 282.
1030ne agency has had an employee working for months gathering in-
formation to determine how much money the federal government spends for
highway safety work and the head of that agency indicated that it would take
another three months to get it. 1965 Hearings pt. 1, at 231, 233.
04Moynihan, supra note 14, at 279.
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Moynihan's proposal for a Federal Automobile Agency is certainly
valid as far as it goes. Centrally controlled research is necessary in
determining what can be done to prevent the growing slaughter on
our highways, but research itself is of little value unless the agency
has the authority to set minimum safety standards for the automo-
biles. The legislation which would establish a central research agency
should also authorize that agency to set minimum standards and to
impose sanctions on manufacturers for failure to meet those standards.
The success of any federal regulatory agency in the field of auto-
mobile safety will necessarily depend upon 2 things: (1) It is im-
perative that those who are chosen to serve in research capacities
in this proposed agency be the most highly qualified men available,
and those in administrative capacities should be capable of under-
standing the viewpoints of both government and industry. (2) The
agency should not be looked upon as a means of forcing the manu-
facturers to submit to arbitrary government regulation.1 5 Of course
the purpose of the agency is some regulation, but the basic precepts
of our private enterprise system should also be preserved. If the
agency were founded upon the proposition of mutual cooperation
between the automobile industry and the central government with
the common goal of reducing the carnage on our highways, the re-
sults of such a program could be extremely rewarding.
Whatever form regulation may take, there will be opposition. It
is a psychological fact that human beings would prefer not to think
about the dangers of living, and this is particularly true of the eter-
nally optimistic American public. As a result we tend to resent those
who force us to face the unpleasant. This resentment would most
certainly be quite intense when the public is forced to recognize the
danger inherent in its most revered symbol of pleasure, status, and
release. Notwithstanding our aversion to facing the unpleasant, we
are capable of reasonable and practical reflection upon problems that
endanger our society as a whole. The public will gradually accept
the innovations and welcome the regulation when they become fully
aware of the magnitude and severity of the problem, and when they
realize how much good that regulation can produce.
There is no simple means of determining the proportions a prob-
lem must assume before a decision is made to impose preventive
measures, but certainly if any contemporary problem deserves national
-publicity and national action, it is the epidemic rampant on our
highways.
JoN A. KERR
103d. at 279-80.
